Shotguns,Weddings, and Lunch Counters: Why Cultural Frames Matter to Constitutional Law by Walker, Anders
Saint Louis University School of Law
Scholarship Commons
All Faculty Scholarship
2011
Shotguns,Weddings, and Lunch Counters: Why
Cultural Frames Matter to Constitutional Law
Anders Walker
Saint Louis University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/faculty
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in All Faculty Scholarship by an
authorized administrator of Scholarship Commons. For more information, please contact erika.cohn@slu.edu, ingah.daviscrawford@slu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Walker, Anders. Shotguns,Weddings, and Lunch Counters: Why Cultural Frames Matter to Constitutional Law. Florida State
University Law Review, vol. 38, no. 345, 2011.
Florida State University Law Review
Volume 38 | Issue 2 Article 4
2011
Shotguns, Weddings, and Lunch Counters: Why
Cultural Frames Matter to Constitutional Law
Anders Walker
0@0.com
Follow this and additional works at: http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida State University Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact bkaplan@law.fsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Anders Walker, Shotguns, Weddings, and Lunch Counters: Why Cultural Frames Matter to Constitutional Law, 38 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. (2011)
.
http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr/vol38/iss2/4
FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY 
LAW REVIEW 
 
 
 
SHOTGUNS, WEDDINGS, AND LUNCH COUNTERS:  
WHY CULTURAL FRAMES MATTER TO CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
 
Anders Walker 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VOLUME 38 
   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WINTER 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NUMBER 2
 
Recommended citation: Anders Walker, Shotguns, Weddings, and Lunch Counters: Why 
Cultural Frames Matter to Constitutional Law, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 345 (2011).  
SHOTGUNS, WEDDINGS, AND LUNCH COUNTERS:
WHY CULTURAL FRAMES MATTER TO
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
ANDERS WALKER*
ABSTRACT
Drawing from social movement theory, this Article shows that both the constitutional 
challenge to gun bans in Illinois and the constitutional challenge to California’s same-sex 
marriage ban have dealt with issues of frame alignment similar to those confronted by the 
civil rights movement in the 1960s. Yet, it is the Second Amendment litigation, ironically, 
that has most closely followed the movement’s attention to aligning legal claims with cul-
tural trends. Out of this analysis emerges a larger claim that the analytics of frame align-
ment, and social movement theory generally, deserve more attention by constitutional schol-
ars, both as a uniform analytic for comparing divergent reform agendas, and for better un-
derstanding the central role of cultural frames in determining the parameters of constitu-
tional rights.
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I.   INTRODUCTION
 Though most constitutional scholars celebrate the civil rights 
movement, few have asked whether and to what extent the move-
ment relates to current efforts of constitutional reform. Yet, the rise 
of direct action in the 1960s marked a bold realignment of the collec-
tive action, social movement frames of the civil rights struggle, a 
movement that has direct relevance to current constitutional battles, 
particularly over marriage and guns. As this Article will show, both 
the constitutional challenge to gun bans in Illinois and the constitu-
tional challenge to California’s same-sex marriage ban have dealt 
with issues of frame alignment similar to those confronted by the civ-
il rights movement in the 1960s.1 Yet, it is the Second Amendment 
                                                                                                                  
 *  Assistant Professor, Saint Louis University School of Law, PhD Yale University 
2003; JD/MA Duke University 1998; BA Wesleyan University 1994. I would like to thank 
Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Ariela Gross, Naomi Mezey, Ariela Dubler, Michael J. Klarman, 
Risa Goluboff, Dan Markel, Carol Rose, Eric Miller, Sam Jordan, Chad Flanders, and Jeff 
Redding for comments on sections of this piece. I would also like to thank the organizers of 
“50 Years after the Sit-Ins: Reflecting on the Role of Protest in Social Movements and Law 
Reform,” University of Virginia School of Law, Charlottesville, Virginia, January 29, 2010, 
the Florida State University College of Law faculty workshop series, and the Law & Hu-
manities Junior Scholar Workshop at Georgetown University Law School, Washington, 
D.C., June 2009.
 1. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010); Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 
No. 3:09-cv-02292-VRW, 2010 WL 3212786 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2010).  
346 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:345 
litigation, ironically, that has most closely followed the movement’s 
attention to aligning legal claims with cultural trends.2
 To illustrate, this Article will proceed in three parts. Part II will 
introduce the analytics of frame alignment, a subset of social move-
ment theory that has been largely neglected by constitutional schol-
ars. The analytics help explain the persuasive power of the civil 
rights movement, particularly the sit-ins, together with strategic in-
tersections between the sit-ins and Supreme Court decisions, includ-
ing Brown v. Board of Education3 and New York Times Co. v. Sulli-
van.4 Part III will show how gun rights proponents learned from the 
civil rights movement, ultimately adopting a pragmatic, frame 
alignment strategy that stressed sportsmanship and self-defense, 
while conceding federal regulation of automatic weapons banned af-
ter the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. in 1968. Part IV will 
show how proponents of same-sex marriage carefully engaged in cul-
tural frame alignment in the 1980s and 1990s, only to be upstaged by 
conservative lawyer Ted Olson, whose pursuit of litigation in the face 
of opposing state trends risks ignoring the basic lessons that the civil 
rights movement has to teach.5
 Out of this analysis emerges a larger claim that the analytics of 
cultural frame alignment—a subset of social movement theory—
deserve closer scrutiny by constitutional scholars, particularly those 
who focus on popular constitutionalism, social movements, and civil 
rights.6 Though leading authorities like Michael J. Klarman, Reva B. 
Siegel, and William N. Eskridge, Jr. have recovered rich narratives 
and articulated important insights about connections between law, 
culture, and rights, they have tended not to engage social movement 
scholarship as fully as they might.7 One reason for this, articulated 
                                                                                                                  
 2. Indeed, current battles over guns and same-sex marriage underscore a core aspect 
of social movement theory that has remained largely ignored by constitutional scholars, 
namely the centrality of cultural frames to constitutional law. For a discussion of cultural 
frames, or “stock,” see Mayer Zald, Culture, Ideology, and Strategic Framing, in COMPARA-
TIVE PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES, MOBILIZING 
STRUCTURES, AND CULTURAL FRAMINGS 261, 266-73 (Doug McAdam, et al. eds., 1996). For 
a discussion of frame bridging, or frame alignment processes generally, see David A. Snow, 
et al., Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation, 51 AM.
SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 464, 467-76 (1986). 
 3. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 4. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
 5. This question is particularly timely given signs that lower courts in California are 
siding with Olsen. See Perry, 2010 WL 3212786. 
 6. Edward Rubin made a similar claim about the divide between law scholars and 
social movement theory in a symposium issue of the Pennsylvania Law Review dedicated 
to social movements. See Edward L. Rubin, Passing Through the Door: Social Movement 
Literature and Legal Scholarship, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2001). For more on frame align-
ment, see generally Snow, supra note 2 and Zald, supra note 2, at 266-74. 
 7. Perhaps the one legal scholar who has written the most about social movements, 
yet cited the least social movement theory, is William Eskridge. Though willing to concede 
that “[l]aw professors have a lot to learn from sociologists and political scientists who have 
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by Edward L. Rubin, is that social movement theory emerged out of 
scholarly interest in mass movements, not litigation, and focused on 
how those movements influenced political opportunities, not consti-
tutional results.8 Yet, this has begun to change as socio-legal scholars 
like Ellen Ann Andersen and James Laue have begun to extend polit-
ical opportunity analysis to “legal opportunity” analysis, indicating 
that social movement analytics developed in the 1970s and 1980s are 
not only relevant to the study of constitutional law, but help to ex-
plain how key aspects of that law hinge on cultural frames.9
 The role of culture in American constitutional law remains one of 
the most undertheorized topics in legal studies.10 To date, the best 
                                                                                                                  
studied social movements,” Eskridge himself spends virtually no time digesting such les-
sons, preferring instead to argue that “social movements literature does not adequately 
reflect the importance of law.” William N. Eskridge, Jr., Channeling: Identity-Based Social 
Movements and Public Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 419, 419, 420 (2001) [hereinafter Eskridge, 
Channeling]; see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social 
Movements on Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062 
(2002). Reva Siegel acknowledges the existence of frame alignment in two articles, describ-
ing it as a movement’s effort to “represent or reinterpret daily life in terms calculated to 
move individuals to action.” Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Consti-
tutionalism in Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191 (2008) [hereinafter Siegel, Dead or Alive]
(discussing the NRA’s strategy in terms of “popular constitutionalism,” not social move-
ment theory); Reva B. Siegel, Text in Contest: Gender and the Constitution from a Social 
Movement Perspective, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 297, 340 (2001) [hereinafter Siegel, Text in Con-
test]. While true, this only partially describes the extent of frame alignment as a set of 
practices by which social movement actors, including litigators, seek to relate their politi-
cal goals to the political goals or cultural assumptions of others. Robert C. Post & Reva B. 
Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of 
the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943, 2000 n.170 (2003). Another study 
that discusses the interaction between social movements, culture and law—but does not 
invoke social movement theory—includes MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL
RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004) (recovering 
the interrelationship between constitutional law, politics, and the black struggle for racial 
equality, without invoking social movement theory).
 8. Rubin, supra note 6, at 46-47; see also Eskridge, Channeling, supra note 7, at 420-21.  
 9. James Laue, still the preeminent theorist of the sit-in movement, defines social 
movements as “broadly based” protests that have their origins in the grassroots, not elites.
JAMES H. LAUE, DIRECT ACTION AND DESEGREGATION, 1960-1962: TOWARD A THEORY OF 
THE RATIONALIZATION OF PROTEST 8-10 (1965). Perhaps the only scholar to truly apply 
social movement theory to legal actors is political scientist Ellen Ann Andersen, whose 
path-breaking study on Lambda Legal provides a theoretical model for this work. See EL-
LEN ANN ANDERSEN, OUT OF THE CLOSETS & INTO THE COURTS: LEGAL OPPORTUNITY 
STRUCTURE AND GAY RIGHTS LITIGATION (2005). Precisely because social movement schol-
ars did not traditionally occupy themselves with constitutional law, constitutional scholars 
have opted for a separate analytic framework, rooted in terms like mobilization, counter-
mobilization, and popular constitutionalism. See, e.g., Siegel, Dead or Alive, supra note 7, 
at 193. A radical example of this position is maintained by Tomiko Brown-Nagin, who ar-
gues that social movements “are generally incompatible with constitutional litigation.”
Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Elites, Social Movements, and the Law: The Case of Affirmative 
Action 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1436, 1439 (2005). 
 10. The best studies focus on “constitutional culture,” or the “interactions among 
members of the polity and between members of the polity and government officials,” to 
create constitutional meaning. Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement 
Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the de facto ERA, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1323, 
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work focuses on a relatively limited definition of “constitutional cul-
ture,” meaning the discursive field in which judges, lawyers, and so-
cial movement actors interact, altering constitutional meanings in 
the process.11 Yet, such studies ignore the full scope of cultural for-
mations, or what Stuart Hall calls the “actual, grounded terrain of 
practices, representations, languages and customs” that animate so-
ciety at any given time, and that inform the manner in which social 
movement actors, and constitutional litigators, choose to frame or 
align their specific legal claims.12 The constantly shifting nature of 
culture writ large, in other words, both precludes legal opportunities 
and, at the same time, opens them but only so long as social move-
ment litigators think strategically about the alignment of legal 
claims with cultural trends.13 To illustrate, this Article borrows from 
social movement theory to articulate explicitly that which is implicit 
in most of the best studies of constitutional change but also to stress 
the practical value of thinking about the relationship between consti-
tutional law and culture in systematic, cross-disciplinary terms, rec-
onciling the fields of law, sociology, and political science. Even law-
yers might benefit from such an approach, for it is they who suffer 
most without an appropriate theoretical understanding of when liti-
gation should be initiated, how it should be framed, and ultimately 
how constitutional law and social movements intersect.
II.   THE SIT-INS AND THE CULTURAL FRAMES
 Perhaps no better example of the alignment between cultural 
frames and constitutional results exists than the civil rights move-
                                                                                                                  
1325 n.6 (2006) [hereinafter Siegel, Constitutional Culture]; Robert M. Cover, The Supreme 
Court 1982 Term—Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 11 (1983) (arguing 
that “the creation of legal meaning—‘jurisgenesis’—takes place always through an essen-
tially cultural medium”); see also Guyora Binder & Robert Weisberg, Cultural Criticism of 
Law, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1149 (1997) (endorsing an ethnographic approach to studying legal 
texts). For an examination of law as a cultural form, see PAUL W. KAHN, THE CULTURAL 
STUDY OF LAW (1999).  
 11. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, supra note 10, at 1325 n.6; see also Jack M. Balkin, 
How Social Movements Change (or Fail to Change) the Constitution: The Case of the New 
Departure, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 27 (2005); Jack M. Balkin, Plessy, Brown, and Grutter:
A Play in Three Acts, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1689 (2005); Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, 
Principles, Practices, and Social Movements, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 927 (2006); Jack M. Balkin, 
What Brown Teaches Us About Constitutional Theory, 90 VA. L. REV. 1537 (2004); Brown-
Nagin, supra note 9. 
 12. Stuart Hall, Gramsci’s Relevence for the Study of Race and Ethnicity (1986), re-
printed in STUART HALL: CRITICAL DIALOGUES IN CULTURAL STUDIES 439 (David Morley & 
Kuan-Hsing Chen eds., 1996). 
 13. See ANDERSEN, supra note 9; ANDERS WALKER, THE GHOST OF JIM CROW: HOW 
SOUTHERN MODERATES USED BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION TO STALL CIVIL RIGHTS 4 
(2009) [hereinafter WALKER, THE GHOST OF JIM CROW]; Sidney Tarrow, Mentalities, Politi-
cal Cultures, and Collective Action Frames: Constructing Meanings Through Action, in 
FRONTIERS IN SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY 174, 189 (Aldon D. Morris & Carol McClurg 
Mueller eds., 1992).  
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ment of the 1950s and 1960s. Two pivotal cases—Brown v. Board of 
Education and New York Times Co. v. Sullivan—illustrate how con-
stitutional litigation stemming from the movement intersected di-
rectly, albeit differently, with social movement organizing on the 
ground, both involving strategic decisions by litigants interested in 
aligning legal claims with prevailing cultural frames.14 As we shall 
see, however, Brown’s success at linking civil rights with cultural 
concerns became complicated by popular consternation over the con-
sequences of school desegregation, resulting in southern hostility and 
northern apathy, while Sullivan’s alignment of civil rights with free 
speech proved conducive to maintaining the media apparatus 
through which the civil rights movement would eventually win  
national support.15
 To explain how this is so, a short introduction to social movement 
theory and frame alignment is helpful. Beginning in the 1970s, soci-
ologists and political scientists inspired by the civil rights movement 
began to take an interest in the various ways that movement organ-
izers articulated reform agendas in terms that average people could 
understand.16 Average understandings, they theorized, hinged on 
“frameworks,” or “schemata of interpretation” that lay individuals 
use to “locate, perceive, identify,” and in short explain events.17 To be 
successful, social movement actors needed to construct their own 
frames, or schematic interpretations, that diagnosed social problems, 
identify a clear prognosis of those problems, and then mobilize target 
audiences to solve them.18 These “collective action frames,” as they 
came to be called, worked best when aligned with the ideas, assump-
tions, and beliefs—in short cultural frames—already held by target 
audiences, a technique that David A. Snow, Robert Benford, and oth-
ers have termed “frame alignment.”19
 Beginning in the 1980s, socio-legal scholars began to identify dif-
ferent types of frame alignment, ultimately settling on four basic cat-
egories.20 In the first, social movement actors who attempt to link two 
                                                                                                                  
 14. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 
U.S. 254 (1964). 
 15. Anders Walker, “Neutral” Principles: Rethinking the Legal History of Civil Rights, 
1934-1964, 40 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 385, 426-32, 435 (2009) [hereinafter Walker,  
“Neutral” Principles].
 16. Early works on the civil rights movement tended to focus on the formation of move-
ment structures. See, e.g., ALDON D. MORRIS, THE ORIGINS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT:
BLACK COMMUNITIES ORGANIZING FOR CHANGE (1984); Lewis M. Killian & Charles U. Smith, 
Negro Protest Leaders in a Southern Community, 38 SOC. FORCES 253 (1960); August Meier, 
Negro Protest Movements and Organizations, 32 J. NEGRO EDUC. 437 (1963).  
 17. ERVING GOFFMAN, FRAME ANALYSIS 21 (1974).  
 18. Robert D. Benford & David A. Snow, Framing Processes and Social Movements: 
An Overview and Assessment, 26 ANN. REV. OF SOCIOLOGY 611, 615-18 (2000). 
 19. See, e.g., Snow, supra note 2, at 464.  
 20. Id. at 467. 
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separate collective action frames, like gun rights and abortion, for 
instance, engage in “frame bridging.”21 In the second, movement 
strategists who focus on one particular issue that average people may 
otherwise be apathetic towards, like global warming, engage in “frame 
amplification.”22 Third, social movement actors who find little support 
for their particular positions may have to broaden their reform agen-
da, or engage in “frame extension” by expanding the boundaries of 
their claims to “encompass interests or points of view that are inci-
dental” to their own goals, but popular among their target audience.23
Finally, movement actors who take on a subject that has very little 
support at all, say plural marriage, might have to completely trans-
form popular opinion in what is called “frame transformation.”24
 While the various strategies of frame alignment can help effect 
social change, they by no means guarantee that movement actors will 
be able to overcome, or for that matter transform the collective “stock 
of meanings, beliefs, ideologies, practices, values,” and “myths,” 
shared by average people, or what socio-legal scholars call culture.25
Interest in the cultural boundaries of reform has led some scholars to 
conclude that reform is ultimately contingent on either appealing to 
or changing prevailing cultural norms, or frames, what Mayer Zald 
has called “cultural stock.”26 While movement campaigns that reject 
cultural stock fail, argues Zald, movement efforts that draw from ex-
isting stock, or reveal “contradictions” in that stock, i.e., between 
prevailing prejudice and popular ideals, tend to succeed.27 As do 
movements that successfully transform cultural stock, either by al-
tering popular opinions, beliefs, or practices (frame transformation), 
for example, or by linking movement claims to larger majority values 
(frame bridging), both processes that fall under the larger theoretical 
umbrella of “cultural framing.”28
 To show how cultural framing impacted the trajectories of civil 
rights, it is helpful to look at the decisions made by litigants in 
Brown v. Board of Education. When Thurgood Marshall first decided 
to file Brown in 1950, his decision reflected a prognosis that constitu-
                                                                                                                  
 21. See id. at 467-69.  
 22. See id. at 469-72.
 23. Id. at 472.
 24. See id. at 473-76.
 25. This particular definition of culture is taken from Benford & Snow, supra note 18, 
at 629. Benford and Snow were themselves influenced by Stuart Hall. See, e.g., Hall, supra 
note 12, at 439. Other scholars interested in the limits that cultural frames place on re-
form include JAMES M. JASPER, THE ART OF MORAL PROTEST: CULTURE, BIOGRAPHY, AND 
CREATIVITY IN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 74-77 (1997) and Jeff Goodwin & James M. Jasper, 
Caught in a Winding, Snarling Vine: The Structural Bias of Political Process Theory, 14 
SOC. F. 27, 28 (1999).  
26. Zald, supra note 2, at 267.
 27. Id.
 28.  Tarrow, supra note 13, at 188. 
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tional litigation, as opposed to voter registration, mass demonstra-
tion, or congressional lobbying, represented a more effective tool for 
social change.29 Of course, this coincided with Marshall’s professional 
background.30 As a lawyer, he represented a particular type of social 
movement actor, an individual bound by procedural rules and doctri-
nal parameters, or legal frames, who at the same time shared the 
social movement goal of effecting political reform.31
 Interestingly, Marshall’s decision to focus on desegregation in the 
decade after World War II marked a prescient awareness of what so-
cio-legal scholars would later call frame alignment.32 Intuitively, 
Marshall knew that by linking a formal legal claim rooted in equal 
protection with the plight of African Americans living under Jim 
Crow, he could take advantage of larger cultural shifts occurring in 
the United States, particularly among national elites.33 As early as 
July of 1946, for example, Attorney General Tom Clark spoke out 
against racial violence in Georgia, declaring it “ ‘an affront to decent 
Americanism.’ ”34 One year later, a civil rights committee appointed 
by President Truman published To Secure These Rights, a bold report 
identifying civil rights—including voting rights, segregation, and re-
strictive covenants—as important areas of needed reform.35 Shortly 
thereafter, Truman himself publicly endorsed the need for robust ac-
tion in the civil rights arena, ordering desegregation of the armed 
forces.36 The Supreme Court joined, declaring racially restrictive cov-
enants unconstitutional in 1948 and undermining segregation in 
higher education in 1950.37
 Though southern officials rankled at such moves, other changes 
materialized at the grassroots that boded positively for Marshall as 
                                                                                                                  
 29.  RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCA-
TION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 293-94 (1975). 
 30.  Id.
 31. See id. 
 32. For Marshall’s decision to target segregated schools directly, see id.
 33. Id. at 290-91. 
 34. MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN 
DEMOCRACY 20 (William Chafe, Gary Gerstle, & Linda Gordon eds., 2000).
 35. CHARLES E. WILSON, ET AL., TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS: THE REPORT OF THE PRES-
IDENT’S COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RIGHTS (1947).  
 36. See DAVID MCCULLOUGH, TRUMAN 569-70 (1992); WILLIAM H. CHAFE, THE UNFIN-
ISHED JOURNEY: AMERICA SINCE WORLD WAR II 91 (3d ed. 1995) [hereinafter CHAFE, UN-
FINISHED JOURNEY]. 
37 See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948). Though often overlooked, To Secure 
These Rights provided a blueprint for much of the civil rights reform that would emerge in 
the 1950s and 1960s, including the ruling against covenants, which borrowed the Commit-
tee’s theory that although covenants were private in nature, they depended on “court or-
ders enforcing the private agreement.” WILSON, supra note 35, at 169.  In 1950, the Court 
decided Sweatt v. Painter holding that the University of Texas Law School had to admit a 
black applicant, and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, holding that Oklahoma could 
not segregate black students within its university system. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 
642 (1950); McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents, 339 U.S. 637, 642 (1950). 
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well.38 One such change—ironically—was a surge of interest in the 
psychological development of youth, particularly teenagers.39 Har-
vard Professors Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck spearheaded such in-
terest by conducting a massive study of 1000 children to discern 
what precisely led some to become productive citizens and others to 
break the law.40 Others followed suite, including New York psychia-
trist Fredric Wertham who became nationally known for exposing 
the harmful effects of violent “crime comics” on youth, even as he be-
came interested in the effects of segregation on race.41 In 1946, for 
example, Wertham served as the “guiding force” behind the creation 
of a free psychiatric clinic in Harlem, geared towards helping African 
Americans deal with the debilitating psychological effects of racism.42
 Impressed, NAACP lawyer Jack Greenberg contacted Wertham to 
see if he might bring black school children from Delaware to be ex-
amined at the free clinic.43 Wertham agreed, later volunteering as an 
expert witness for Greenberg in the Delaware case Belton v. 
Gebhart,44 one of the five segregation cases that would be consolidat-
ed into Brown v. Board of Education.45 In court, Wertham argued 
that segregated schools engendered an “unsolvable emotional con-
flict” in the minds of minority youth, ultimately causing “tension in 
all interpersonal relationships.”46
 Wertham’s testimony in the Delaware portion of Brown, together 
with the work of social scientists Franklin Frazier, Kenneth B. 
Clark, and others, proved a strategic success.47 Not only did the scien-
                                                                                                                  
 38. Trends in the South actually went against racial equality as South Carolina Sena-
tor Strom Thurmond led a revolt by southern democrats in the aftermath of Truman’s civil 
rights plank, creating a third “States’ Rights,” or “Dixiecrats” Party. See MICHAEL R.
GARDNER, HARRY TRUMAN AND CIVIL RIGHTS 99, 101-03 (2002). 
 39. See JAMES GILBERT, A CYCLE OF OUTRAGE: AMERICA’S REACTION TO THE JUVENILE 
DELINQUENT IN THE 1950S 183 (1986).  
 40. Education: Blueprint of Danger, TIME, Oct. 30, 1950, at 79. 
 41. See BART BEATY, FEDRIC WERTHAM AND THE CRITIQUE OF MASS CULTURE 134 (2005). 
 42. KLUGER, supra note 29, at 442-43. 
 43. See BEATY, supra note 41, at 95. 
 44. 87 A.2d 862 (Del. Ch. 1952). 
 45. See KLUGER, supra note 29, at 443-44.  
 46. Id. at 444; Fredric Wertham, Psychological Effects of School Segregation, Papers 
of the NAACP, Part 3, Ser. C, Reel 4.  
 47. To support the theory that segregation damaged black youth, the NAACP not only 
sent black children to be examined in New York, but invited Wertham down to serve as an 
expert witness in Delaware. BEATY, supra note 41, at 95. Wertham testified in Belton v. 
Gebhart, the Delaware portion of the series of cases that would eventually be consolidated 
into Brown v. Board of Education. In his testimony, Wertham contended that although 
“the physical differences” between black and white schools in Delaware was “not at all 
really material” it was nevertheless true that “segregation in general” was “anti-
educational.” KLUGER, supra note 29, at 445. By this he meant that “most of the children” 
that he examined “interpret segregation in one way and only one way—and that is they 
interpret it as punishment.” Id. Whether the state of Delaware wanted to punish black 
children or not, continued Wertham, had “nothing to do with it.” What he was interested in 
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tists testify to the psychological development of children, an issue 
that possessed a high level of what socio-legal scholars call “reso-
nance,” but their very presence aligned the cultural authority of the 
scientific establishment with Marshall’s diagnostic framing of segre-
gation as an institution that caused harm—not something that white 
southerners were willing to admit.48 The Supreme Court proved so 
impressed with Marshall’s social science evidence that Chief Justice 
Earl Warren used it to support the core legal claim that segregation 
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
because it harmed black youth.49 “Segregation of white and colored 
children in public schools,” asserted Chief Justice Earl Warren, two 
years after Wertham testified in Delaware, “has a detrimental effect 
upon the colored children.”50 To support its assertion, the Court cited 
a string of sociological studies, gathering them in footnote eleven of 
its ruling.51
 Of course, white southerners disagreed. Aghast that the Court 
had invoked science to overturn Jim Crow—a legal system that had 
enjoyed longstanding constitutional support—southern segregation-
ists engaged in what social movement theorists call counter framing, 
or a contest to undermine the alignments made by social movement 
actors; in this case Marshall.52 “I submit that white children also 
have rights,” proclaimed Mississippi Senator James O. Eastland, on-
ly weeks after Brown was handed down.53 “[T]ensions and frictions 
generally found in an interracial school,” continued Eastland, “cer-
tainly will have a bad effect on a white child, and in my judgment 
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will interfere with the white child’s ability to learn.”54 South Carolina 
journalist William D. Workman echoed Eastland’s concerns in a book 
that earned him region-wide acclaim.55 “[T]he integrationists, who cry 
for racial admixture in the cause of bolstering the personality devel-
opment of a Negro minority,” complained Workman, “do not hesitate 
to compel the mingling of a white minority with a black majority 
without any consideration of the inevitable psychological impact up-
on the personalities of the white children.”56
 To support the counter-thesis that integration would harm whites, 
segregationists employed elaborate compilations of crime rates, vene-
real disease rates, and illegitimacy rates, even manipulating state law 
to exacerbate seeming disparities in these rates.57 For example, in 1955 
Mississippi invalidated common law marriage in the hopes it might 
artificially boost the appearance of black illegitimacy rates in the 
state.58 North Carolina, conversely, manipulated state law to mask the 
compilation of white illegitimacy rates by encouraging adoptions.59
 Segregationist manipulations of statistics sought to align the 
southern position on race with an aspect of the national concern over 
child development that Marshall had not anticipated, namely white 
delinquency.60 Though concerns over juvenile delinquency and crime 
had existed as early as the 1920s, such fears exploded in the 1950s—
after Marshall had already decided on his litigation strategy in 
Brown.61 Part of the reason for this was an actual increase in the rate 
of juvenile crime, a jump of fifty-five percent between 1952 and 
1957.62 Though partially explained by changes in the types of crimes 
that were tabulated, mass media portrayals of teen rebellion exacer-
bated public perceptions of the crisis.63 Hollywood films like The Wild 
One, Blackboard Jungle, and Rebel Without a Cause all stoked popu-
lar concern over youth crime.64
 Even Fredric Wertham, the same psychiatrist who testified for the 
NAACP in Belton v. Gebhart, published a book on delinquency enti-
tled Seduction of the Innocent in 1954, the same year that Brown was 
                                                                                                                  
 54. Id. 
 55. See WILLIAM D. WORKMAN, JR., THE CASE FOR THE SOUTH (1960). 
 56. Id. at 241.  
 57. WALKER, THE GHOST OF JIM CROW, supra note 13, at 41-42, 77-82.  
 58. Id. at 42. 
 59. Id. at 80-81.  
 60. See generally Anders Walker, Blackboard Jungle: Delinquency, Desegregation, and 
the Cultural Politics of Brown, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1911, 1953 (2010).  
 61. See GILBERT, supra note 39, at 3.
 62. GRACE PALLADINO, TEENAGERS 161 (1996). 
 63. For example, while the FBI reported that juvenile delinquency rose fifty-five per-
cent between 1952 and 1957, the majority of reported crimes were vaguely described as 
incorrigible behavior, disorderly conduct, and violation of curfew. Id. at 161. 
 64. See GILBERT, supra note 39, at 182, 183, 188.
2011] SHOTGUNS, WEDDINGS, AND LUNCH COUNTERS 355
decided.65 While the book concentrated on the negative effect of crime 
comics, illustrated serials with titles like Tales from the Crypt, Re-
form School Girl, and Crime Detective, Wertham endorsed a larger 
theory that children were uniquely vulnerable to negative influences 
in their surroundings, a claim made again and again by segregation-
ists.66 “Even more than crime,” wrote Wertham, “juvenile delinquency 
reflects the social values current in a society.”67 Both adults and chil-
dren absorb these social values in their daily lives, argued Wertham, 
whether at home, in school, at work, or “in all the communications 
imparted as entertainment, instruction or propaganda through the 
mass media, from the printed word to television.”68
 As the cultural frame of delinquency became more and more per-
vasive, Thurgood Marshall found northern support for public school 
desegregation waning. Though opinion polls registered initial support 
for Brown, that support never rose to a level significant enough to 
overcome southern opposition to civil rights bills in Congress in the 
1950s.69 For example, a civil rights bill aimed at curbing massive re-
sistance to Brown was almost completely gutted by southern con-
gressmen in 1957, while a similar bill was neutered by southern 
elected officials in 1959.70 Even antics like Governor Orval Faubus’s 
refusal to protect black students from white mobs in Little Rock in 
1957 only triggered a temporary spike in northern outrage, doing 
relatively little to stoke sustained northern support for Brown.71 For 
example, one year after President Eisenhower sent federal troops 
into the city to maintain peace, Orval Faubus closed Central High 
School, effectively ending integration, without significant northern 
complaints.72
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 In fact, just as the problems in Little Rock subsided, opposition to 
school desegregation actually began to grow in the North, particular-
ly in northern cities like New York.73 As early as 1957, for example, 
white parents in Brooklyn resisted NAACP efforts to redistrict public 
schools in Bedford-Stuyvesant, desperately attempting to keep their 
children separated from blacks.74 Animating white fears were con-
cerns over juvenile delinquency, reinforced by a grand jury investiga-
tion in November 1957 that found remarkable levels of youth vio-
lence and crime in New York City, so much so that the jury recom-
mended police officers be stationed in schools to maintain peace.75 In
December, disaster struck when George Goldfarb, the principal of an 
integrated high school in Brooklyn, committed suicide after being 
called to testify before a grand jury investigating school violence, in-
cluding the rape of a female student in his school’s basement.76
 Pleasantly surprised, southern newspapers and political leaders 
trained their sights northward. Racially “[m]ixed school violence” led 
to Goldfarb’s suicide, announced Mississippi’s Jackson Daily News.77
“[I] would ‘hate to think what the metropolitan press would have 
done to us,’ ” exclaimed Arkansas Governor Orval Faubus in January 
1958, “if the Brooklyn school violence had happened in Little Rock.”78
“Racists” at the New York Times were trying to hide the role that 
blacks played in the violence, announced the Montgomery’s Advertis-
er.79 White southerners were “deeply sympathetic with the citizens of 
Brooklyn in the difficulties they are experiencing in maintaining the 
integrity and independence of their public schools,” announced for-
mer Senator of Georgia Herman Eugene Talmadge.80
 Southern exuberance over New York’s racial quandaries coincided 
with a larger shift in the South away from defiant opposition, or 
massive resistance, and towards a more moderate, legalist stance 
against integration.81 Though legal historian Michael Klarman ar-
gues that the extremist backlash to Brown lasted into 1963, a close 
survey of the evidence indicates that this might be an overstate-
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ment.82 By the spring of 1959, the more radical aspects of the back-
lash to Brown in the South had begun to fizzle, entering what histo-
rian Numan V. Bartley has called a “thermidorean reaction,” as 
moderates replaced massive resisters across the region.83
 Meanwhile, debate broke out in elite legal northern circles over 
the wisdom of the Court’s foray into school segregation in the first 
place. In January 1958, Learned Hand, a revered federal circuit 
judge, publicly criticized the Supreme Court for exceeding its consti-
tutional bounds, behaving like a “third legislative chamber” and even 
jeopardizing American democracy.84 According to Hand, “nothing” in 
the Constitution granted the Court the power to invalidate state law, 
including Jim Crow laws in the South.85 In fact, the federal circuit 
judge went so far as to attack the theory of judicial review itself, ar-
guing that it was “not a logical deduction from the structure of the 
Constitution,” but amounted instead to a “practical condition” that 
should only be invoked when absolutely necessary to preserve demo-
cratic government.86 Such was not the case with school desegregation, 
he maintained, a policy issue that had little, if anything, to do with 
vital national interests.87 According to Hand, questions of public edu-
cation and race constituted little more than debates over “relative 
values” best left to the legislative branch of government.88 Judicial 
interventions in the matter, argued Hand, amounted to little more 
than dubious grabs for power that failed to “accord” with the “under-
lying presuppositions of popular government.”89
 Stunned, leading constitutional scholar Herbert Wechsler re-
sponded directly to Hand’s critique of judicial review during a spring 
address at Harvard Law School in 1959.90 To Wechsler’s mind, the 
Court had not been wrong to go down the road of liberal reform, but 
had done so in an inappropriate, “ad hoc” manner.91 Of particular 
concern was Brown’s reliance on social science evidence, particularly 
data on child psychology, that the Court used to bolster its claim that 
segregation, per se, violated equal protection by harming black chil-
dren.92 “I find it hard to think [that Brown] really turned upon the 
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facts,” declared Wechsler to a shocked audience at Harvard.93 What 
if, he pondered, students were actually “hurt” by integration?94
 The idea that students might be hurt by integration was not 
something that either Thurgood Marshall or the Warren Court had 
considered in 1954, yet cultural frames had shifted to the point that 
it was on people’s minds by 1959, particularly in New York. Not only 
had the New York Times provided extensive coverage of violence and 
crime in desegregated schools in Brooklyn, but the paper had also 
covered shocking abuses endured by black students in the American 
South. Almost immediately after federal forces left Little Rock, Ar-
kansas in November 1957, for example, the New York Times reported 
a campaign of cruel harassment by white students against their 
black peers that lasted for the remainder of the school year.95 Instead 
of psychological healing, the nine black students found themselves 
kicked, pushed, showered with food, and, in the case of one unfortu-
nate African American girl, pushed down a flight of stairs.96
 Not only were the above instances of racial harm all reported in 
the New York Times, where Herbert Wechsler and others could read 
about them, but one of the Little Rock Nine actually abandoned Lit-
tle Rock for New York City in January 1958.97 In a well-publicized 
move, Minnijean Brown left Central High School and accepted a 
scholarship to attend the private New Lincoln School on West 110th 
Street in Manhattan, claiming it unlikely that her eight black peers 
could withstand much more abuse from their white counterparts.98
 Though Wechsler did not mention Little Rock directly in his Har-
vard address, Minnijean Brown’s flight helps contextualize his ob-
servation that integration might, in some cases, have “hurt” blacks.99
To his mind, this meant that Brown’s equal protection argument was 
itself unstable, a complaint that he chose to articulate in terms of the 
ruling’s lack of neutrality. Though many took Wechsler’s words to be 
an overly-legalist approach to constitutional reasoning, the kind of 
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argument that someone who knew nothing about actual racial condi-
tions in the South might make, Wechsler had in fact been involved in 
southern racial politics since the 1930s.100 As a young attorney, he 
had worked for three years to free black communist, Angelo Hern-
don, from a chain gang in Georgia, ultimately writing the bulk of 
Herndon’s briefs before the Supreme Court between 1934 and 
1937.101 In 1941, Wechsler struck a crippling blow to white suprema-
cy in the South by arguing United States v. Classic,102 a case that de-
clared Louisiana’s white primary a form of state action thereby pav-
ing the way for Thurgood Marshall’s death blow to the white primary 
in Smith v. Allwright.103
 Rather than an outsider who understood little about racial issues 
in the South, Wechsler had in fact been deeply involved in those is-
sues for almost three decades.104 However, the cases that he argued 
tended to be aligned much more closely with national and even re-
gional, cultural frames than Brown—particularly after the moral 
panic over delinquency. How so? In Herndon, Wechsler had been 
careful to frame his appeal in terms of First Amendment free speech, 
not black rights or communism.105 This represented a type of frame 
bridging, an effort to link the legal argument of a relatively unpopu-
lar client to a cause that enjoyed relatively widespread support, in-
deed what some identified as a “ ‘bedrock principle’ ” of American 
democracy, the First Amendment.106 Similarly, even though United 
States v. Classic had huge implications for black voting rights in the 
Deep South, a fact that Wechsler was well aware of when he took the 
case, he refused to even mention the disfranchisement of black peo-
ple in his Supreme Court briefs, focusing instead on whether the lev-
el of state involvement in Louisiana’s white primary was sufficient to 
make it a form of state action.107
 Once Wechsler’s past involvement in civil rights is recovered, his 
plea for neutral principles emerges, not as an insensitive bid for legal 
formalism, but as a call for more diligent frame alignment, a more 
strategic attention to how the Court framed its civil rights rulings so 
as to maximize cultural synergy and minimize popular backlash. Not 
only had this become an issue with Brown, but the Court had decided 
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a string of cases based on Brown that had nothing to do with the psy-
chological development of children, cases that bothered Wechsler be-
cause they extended the child-centered harm argument to adult con-
texts, including public buses, parks, and golf courses.108 “What shall 
we think,” he queried, “of the Court’s extension of [Brown] to other 
public facilities, such as public transportation, parks, golf courses, 
bath houses, and beaches, which no one is obliged to use—all by per 
curiam decisions?”109
 Dubious of the Supreme Court’s reasoning in civil rights cases be-
ginning with Brown, Wechsler offered to formulate his own reasoning 
on civil rights in a libel case filed by Montgomery Police Commis-
sioner L.B. Sullivan against the New York Times for running a full 
page ad criticizing Montgomery’s handling of sit-in demonstrations 
in 1960.110 Though different from most of the lawsuits that arose out 
of the sit-ins—almost all of which focused on whether evicting de-
monstrators from private restaurants was a form of state action—
New York Times v. Sullivan focused on whether the South could keep 
the national media out of the region by way of frivolous libel suits.111
This question touched directly on the larger issue of cultural fram-
ing, for without the media, direct action protest would arguably nev-
er have been able to reach national audiences, or have a national ef-
fect.112
 Aware that the fate of direct action protest might be in jeopardy, 
Wechsler engaged in a deft example of frame bridging, linking civil 
rights in the American South to the nationally popular First 
Amendment right to free speech.113 Specifically, he likened Alabama’s 
libel law to the widely unpopular Sedition Act of 1798, a measure so 
repressive that it had gone down in American history as an example 
of government oppression.114 Gambling that most Americans would 
not approve of an overly aggressive libel doctrine that allowed for the 
curtailment of speech when the speaker did not have actual malice, 
Wechsler convinced the Supreme Court to rule in favor of the Times 
and impose a more onerous burden on libel cases in the future, an 
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argument that led many news organizations, including the Times, to 
send reporters back into Dixie.115
 Though rarely compared to Brown, New York Times v. Sullivan 
was similar in that the lead attorneys in both cases, Thurgood Mar-
shall and Herbert Wechsler, both tried to align their legal claims 
with prevailing cultural norms. In Marshall’s case, this meant align-
ing civil rights with national concern for youth, while in Wechsler’s, 
it meant aligning civil rights with national support for the First 
Amendment. Both succeeded at the Supreme Court level, yet Brown
encountered considerable resistance, arguably failing to do what it 
set out to accomplish by 1959. New York Times v. Sullivan, by con-
trast, helped the movement win federal legislation that removed ob-
stacles to black voting rights.116
 In the next section, we will see how proponents of gun rights 
learned from the movement, carefully aligning their own legal claims 
with prevailing cultural trends. Though culture, as Marshall learned, 
can be hard to read, Second Amendment advocates, like the National 
Rifle Association (NRA) began to successfully align their interests 
with popular concerns in the 1970s, arguably even shaping those 
concerns by building popular support for sportsmanship and self-
defense. This process of frame alignment reinforces the notion that 
lawyers, like social movement actors, must frame their agendas in 
terms that most people can support and understand.  
III.   THE SECOND AMENDMENT AND CULTURAL FRAMES
 Though generally not associated with the civil rights movement, 
the American gun lobby proved an astute imitator of movement tac-
tics, arguably even emerging like a phoenix out of the movement’s 
ashes. Prior to the 1960s, for example, organizations like the NRA 
had little interest in lobbying to curb federal gun controls. Founded 
in 1871, the NRA began its career primarily interested in target-
shooting, not defending the right to bear arms. In fact, from 1871 to 
1977 the organization’s main agenda was promoting marksmanship 
and safety.117 Organized by Civil War veterans disgruntled with the 
Union Army’s lack of emphasis on “target practice,” a skill the mili-
tary believed would instill a negative “sense of individualism among 
the soldiers,” the NRA built a “state-of-the-art rifle range” at Creed-
moor, New York to train soldiers, primarily National Guardsmen, in 
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marksmanship.118 The NRA also began holding shooting competi-
tions, including an international competition that drew almost 8000 
spectators to Creedmoor in 1874.119 From 1874 to 1977, “marksman-
ship training” and “firearms safety” remained the primary concerns 
of the NRA while lobbying formed only a “minor part” of its  
institutional mission.120
 Evidence of the NRA’s initial lack of political interest in gun con-
trol emerged in 1934, when Congress enacted a sweeping National 
Firearms Act regulating certain types of machine guns, short-
barreled shotguns, and silencers.121 While a strict textualist reading 
of the Second Amendment might have justified challenging such a 
law, the NRA refrained.122 Part of this was due to the negative conno-
tations of the guns themselves, all of which were identified by the 
Court as gangster weapons, made famous during a frightening wave 
of organized gang violence during the first half of the 1930s.123
 By contrast, the 1934 Act did not regulate military-style weapons, 
heavier arms that the National Guardsmen training at Creedmoor 
might use.124 In a 1939 case challenging the Act, the Supreme Court 
of the United States declared, ironically, that the Second Amend-
ment only protected military-style weapons from federal regulation, 
not gangster weapons, hunting rifles, or any other type of small arm 
that did not have an obvious military use.125 To support this view, the 
Court cited the text of the Second Amendment itself, which rational-
ized limits on federal gun regulations because of the need for “ ‘well 
regulated’ ” state militias to the “ ‘security of a free State.’ ”126
 Precisely because the NRA was in the business of training state 
militias, it did not rankle at regulations controlling nonmilitia style 
guns. This apolitical stance changed, however, when the federal gov-
ernment moved to control military-style weapons in 1968. That year, 
Congress enacted a sweeping Gun Control Act (GCA), spurred by 
outrage over the assassinations of Robert F. Kennedy and Martin 
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Luther King, Jr.127 While older NRA leaders tended to support the 
legislation, which recodified the National Firearms Act of 1934, a 
younger cadre of activist-oriented “hard-liners” viewed the GCA to be 
the beginning of a larger, liberal assault on gun rights generally in 
the United States.128 Led by a former Border Patrol officer named 
Harlon Carter, these “Young Turks” voted proponents of the GCA out 
of power in 1977 and quickly made lobbying against gun regulations 
one of the primary functions of the association.129
 For constitutional scholar Reva Siegel, Harlon’s insurgents 
mounted a relatively straightforward campaign of “popular consti-
tionalism” aimed at upholding an individual, not collective right to 
bear arms.130 To do this, they joined an “emergent New Right move-
ment” that also “sought restoration of the Constitution in matters 
concerning criminal defendants’ rights, gun control, and other ‘social 
issues,’ including prayer, busing, and abortion.”131 While Siegel might 
have identified this move as a type of frame bridging, she avoids any 
discussion of frame alignment in her analysis, focusing instead on 
the insurgents’ use of direct mail techniques to push the NRA to the 
right and, ultimately, contribute to a larger transformation of “the 
Republican Party platform.”132 A crucial part of this platform, argues 
Siegel, was the appointment of Republican judges willing to frame 
conservative legal causes, like the individual right to bear arms, in 
terms of “ ‘original intent,’ ” a skillful way of “changing the Constitu-
tion” by avoiding the amendment process and calling instead for the 
restoration of first principles.133
 While all of this is true, Siegel’s reluctance to focus on frame 
alignment obfuscates the level of strategy that went into the NRA’s 
litigation campaigns. For example, despite the fact that the NRA vig-
orously pursued an individual right to bear arms, as Siegel argues, it 
never challenged the 1968 Gun Control Act in court.134 Much like civ-
il rights attorneys Thurgood Marshall and Herbert Wechsler, NRA 
lawyers carefully aligned their legal claims with cultural positions 
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that they believed most Americans would condone at the time, posi-
tions that did not include combat weapons. This meant that wide-
spread, private ownership of military-style weapons—AK-47s, M-16s, 
and so on—never made it onto the NRA’s litigation agenda, even 
though past Supreme Court rulings like Miller indicated that these 
were precisely the type of weapons that the Second Amendment did 
indeed protect.135
 Why did the NRA, a diligent if not aggressive lobbying group, not 
promote deregulating military-style weapons through court cases?136
Perhaps the best answer is that American attitudes towards mili-
tary-style weapons—their cultural frame, if you will—evolved con-
siderably after 1939 away from images of responsible National 
Guardsmen keeping guns safely in their homes, to radical extremists 
plotting government overthrow. To take just a few examples, not long 
after the GCA’s passage in 1968, stories began to break of people ar-
rested under the law, many with ties to right-wing extremism and 
organized crime. On June 5, 1969, for example, Alcohol, Tobacco, and 
Firearms agents arrested Arthur Needles, a supplier to right wing 
groups and the mob in Suffolk County, New York, seizing “dynamite 
bombs, machine guns, and dozens of rifles, shotguns, and hand-
guns.”137 On July 19, 1969, federal agents arrested “Robert Bolivar De-
Pugh, founder of the ultra-right Minutemen,” a covert organization 
dedicated to “stockpiling weapons” in preparation for “a Communist 
take-over of all governmental machinery in the United States.”138 More 
raids followed of Nazis, the Ku Klux Klan, the Black Panthers, and 
other groups, none of whom enjoyed majority support.139
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 In 1995, popular opposition to extremist militias exploded when 
Timothy McVeigh, a disgruntled ex-soldier with militia ties bombed a 
federal building in Oklahoma City.140 While Siegel notes that the 
NRA took an overtly public stand against militias at this point, even 
hiring Charlton Heston to soften the organization’s image, she does 
not invoke the analytic of frame alignment to explain the organiza-
tion’s actions.141 Yet, such an analytic shows how the NRA engaged in 
a strategy similar to the one that civil rights lawyers first attempted 
in Brown and then again in Sullivan, namely aligning legal claims 
with prevailing cultural trends, in this instance frames that opposed 
militias but supported self-defense.142 Indications of such a trend 
emerged early. In 1969, Republican Senator Roman Hruska of Ne-
braska declared that handgun regulations should be left to the 
states.143 “[U]rban unrest” contributed to this sentiment, as riots 
“spurred sales of guns” for use in self-defense.144 When Chicago Con-
gressman Abner Mikva proposed a ban on handguns in Illinois in 
1971, he confronted significant opposition in the state house and 
senate.145 Indiana Senator Birch Bayh encountered similar problems 
in 1972 when he tried to increase regulation of handguns following 
an assassination attempt on Alabama Governor George Wallace.146
Both Senators Jacob K. Javits of New York and Charles H. Percy of 
Illinois confronted problems when they tried to introduce a federal 
ban on handguns in “areas where violent crime is 20 per cent or more 
above the national average.”147 Though local urban populations tend-
ed to favor such bans, national majorities proved skeptical.148
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 Political support also began to build for sportsmen. In October 
1969, Massachusetts Senator Edward M. Kennedy failed to block an 
exception to the 1968 Gun Control Act exempting certain types of 
shotgun shells popular among hunters from licensing require-
ments.149 Taking this as a sign that sportsmen should be exempted, 
Indiana Senator Birch Bayh attempted to push through a more re-
strictive federal gun control law, making sure to exempt weapons 
used for “ ‘sporting purposes,’ ” but failed.150 Such political trends sent 
clear signals to the NRA. Regardless of the Second Amendment’s text 
and the Supreme Court’s ruling in United States v. Miller, frame 
alignment placed the greatest chance of success on hunting weapons 
and handguns.151
 By the 1990s, rights-based Second Amendment claims were joined 
by another argument, one that countered historians who challenged 
the idea that the Second Amendment could be understood outside the 
militia context. Specifically, NRA advocates fleshed out the dual posi-
tion that not only was the right to bear arms an individual constitu-
tional right, but also that the right to bear arms in self-defense was 
an even greater, absolute right worthy of constitutional protection 
independent of the Second Amendment.152 For example, NRA official 
Wayne LaPierre argued in 1994 that the “use of arms for self-
defense” was a right that derived from natural law itself, predating 
the founding.153 One year later, Tanya Metaksa, executive director for 
the NRA’s Institute for Legislative Action, maintained that self de-
fense was nothing less than “the primary civil right” without which 
“there are no rights.”154
 Though Siegel does not mention it, Metaksa and Pierre’s attempt 
to frame self-defense as a civil right represented yet another example 
of cultural frame alignment by the NRA. Conscious of popular opposi-
tion to militia related violence like the Oklahoma City bombing, both 
Metaksa and Pierre shored up the NRA’s legal position by aligning 
their legal claims with the civil rights tradition of the 1960s, even 
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declaring the NRA “America’s oldest civil rights organization,” a not-
so-subtle allusion to the 1909 founding of the NAACP.155
 Perhaps because she does not focus on frame alignment, Siegel 
misses the reinvention of self-defense as a civil right. Yet, this is ar-
guably one of the more interesting aspects of the NRA litigation sto-
ry. Indeed, the NRA and other gun groups would stress ties to the 
civil rights movement even more explicitly in the litigation challeng-
ing Washington, D.C.’s handgun ban in 2008. That year, the NRA 
joined other social movement actors interested in gun rights, includ-
ing the libertarian Institute for Justice, Washington attorney Alan 
Gura, a majority of senators and representatives in the United 
States Congress, and, perhaps surprisingly, the Congress of Racial 
Equality, or CORE.156 Founded in 1942, “CORE spent over two dec-
ades advocating non-violent protest as a means of dismantling racial 
segregation in the American South.”157 In 1947, CORE targeted seg-
regation on interstate carriers by sending integrated buses through 
the Deep South, an endeavor that it repeated in 1961 only to find its 
“freedom riders” targeted by white racists in places like Anniston and 
Montgomery, Alabama.158
 Precisely because CORE activists found themselves confronting 
repeated instances of white violence, the organization gradually grew 
weary of nonviolence as a political strategy, particularly nonviolent 
refusals to engage in armed self-defense.159 Indeed, by the close of 
1966, CORE president Floyd McKissick joined black activists like 
Stokely Carmichael, who rejected Thurgood Marshall’s early push for 
integration, and opted instead for “Black Power.”160 McKissick even 
went so far as to call nonviolence “a dying philosophy.”161
 Convinced that nonviolence had become ineffectual and that black 
equality hinged on gun ownership and armed self-defense, CORE fo-
cused its Heller brief on the Fourteenth Amendment, arguing that 
many of the amendment’s framers intended that the Due Process and 
Privileges and Immunities Clauses be used to protect the rights of 
freed slaves to own guns.162 Though the NRA resisted such an argu-
ment, Alan Gura, the Institute for Justice, and a majority of United 
States senators and congressmen agreed, marking a significant effort 
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to align the legal frame of private gun ownership with the cultural 
frame of black rights.163
 The Supreme Court, perhaps surprisingly, sanctioned this reason-
ing, adopting the originalist claim that the Fourteenth Amendment 
was designed to protect black gun ownership, even though the 
Amendment itself did not technically apply to the District of Colum-
bia.164 Why the Court cited such evidence was not clear as a matter of 
law, a point that Siegel notes.165 Yet, the Court’s decision to cite the 
Fourteenth Amendment argument may ultimately have had less to 
do with legal doctrine than frame alignment. Because CORE linked 
gun ownership to black rights, the citation to black history might 
have appealed to the Court as an olive branch to the black communi-
ty of D.C. that had, after all, voted for the gun ban. Whether this was 
true or not, prominent African Americans, including future president 
Barack Obama, endorsed the Supreme Court’s opinion  
in Heller.166
 Immediately following the Supreme Court’s ruling against D.C., 
Alan Gura filed a follow-up case in the Northern District of Illinois, 
arguing that Chicago’s handgun ban, dating to 1982, violated the Se-
cond Amendment. Parallel suits followed, including two suits by the 
NRA, one against the Village of Oak Park, Illinois and the other 
against the City of Chicago.167
 Both the NRA and Gura argued, as in Heller, that the Fourteenth 
Amendment was intended to protect freed people of color in the post-
Civil War South by protecting their right to bear arms against con-
fiscation by Klan-governed southern states.168 However, the NRA 
stressed the Amendment’s Due Process Clause, while Gura dedicated 
a majority of his brief to the Amendment’s privileges and immunities 
clause.169 This divergence, though subtle, represented its own form of 
frame alignment. By aligning his brief with privileges and immuni-
ties, Gura hoped to gain the support of legal academics and liberals 
who opposed the Supreme Court’s narrow curtailment of the clause 
in the Reconstruction era Slaughterhouse Cases. He, agreed that an 
expanded reading of the clause might be used not only to help gun 
owners, but also to help other, more liberal interests, not least of 
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them free speech, abortion, and, perhaps ironically given Perry v. 
Schwarzenegger’s challenge to Proposition 8 in California, gay 
rights.170 Gura’s decision to focus on privileges and immunities, in 
other words, represented a classic case of frame bridging, by connect-
ing the cause of gun owners to a larger panoply of liberal positions.  
 Conversely, the NRA pursued a more conservative, less liberal 
line of argument, pushing the Court to incorporate the Second 
Amendment through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.171 While this position also required the overruling of 
precedent—the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Cruick-
shank172—it held less interest for law scholars and liberals. Of course, 
this represented its own form of frame alignment, a bid to keep con-
servative support for gun rights high, including conservative support 
on the Supreme Court. During oral argument, for example, Justice 
Scalia endorsed the idea of incorporating the Second Amendment to 
the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, but objected to the privileges and immunities argu-
ment, the so called “darling of the professoriate.”173 Justice Alito 
agreed, making it clear in the Court’s majority opinion that the Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause would be untouched, while holding that 
the Second Amendment should in fact be incorporated to the states 
because “the right to keep and bear arms was highly valued for pur-
poses of self-defense.”174
 The Court’s emphasis on self-defense in McDonald was revealing, 
an indication that the gun lobby’s frame alignment strategies had 
worked. Despite differences in litigation strategy, both the NRA and 
Alan Gura had agreed on one thing, litigating against handgun bans 
as infringements on the right to self-defense represented a more 
strategic alignment of legal and cultural frames than trying to over-
turn more stringent regulations, like the GCA’s limits on automatic 
weapons. Though the Supreme Court had once maintained that mili-
tary-style weapons were the only weapons protected by the Second 
Amendment, the NRA, and other proponents of gun rights like Gura, 
realized that such a position had become politically and culturally 
untenable by the close of the twentieth century. Indeed, while the 
NRA did indicate support for a bill tightening the definition of ma-
chine guns in 2007, its litigation team steered clear of an outright 
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challenge, indicating that the lobby had learned the value of prudent 
frame alignment.175 The fact that both the NRA and Gura made black 
rights a cornerstone of their Second Amendment arguments in Heller
and McDonald indicates that at least some of this strategy might have 
derived from earlier lessons learned by the civil rights movement.176
 In the next section, we will see how lessons from the civil rights 
movement shaped not only gun litigation, but litigation on behalf of 
lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB) social movement groups as well. As
with the Second Amendment, LGB litigators, like Lambda Legal, 
worked diligently to align legal claims with cultural frames, achiev-
ing generally positive results. However, the decision by conservative 
lawyer Ted Olson to bring a legal challenge to California’s same-sex 
marriage ban indicates a radical departure from the frame alignment 
lessons that the civil rights era has to teach.  
IV.   SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND CULTURAL FRAMES
 Though generally not associated with guns, another area of con-
stitutional law heavily implicated in the alignment of legal and cul-
tural frames is gay rights, an issue that, not coincidentally, can also 
trace its lineage to the end of the civil rights era. Prior to the 1970s, 
for example, most states criminalized sexual conduct between per-
sons of the same sex, and no organized movement existed to lobby for 
legal protections on their behalf.177 This began to change in the 1960s, 
however, when the American Law Institute recommended the de-
criminalization of sodomy and the American Civil Liberties Union 
amended its policy on homosexuality, agreeing to represent gay 
plaintiffs in discrimination suits.178 Expressly gay litigation groups 
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formed not long thereafter, including the Lambda Legal Defense 
Fund in 1972, the Gay Rights Advocates (GRA) in 1977, and the Gay 
and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders (GLAD) in 1978.179
 While gay litigation groups like Lambda factor into most legal his-
tories of LGB social movements, a dramatically different level of 
granularity emerges in the work of socio-legal scholars who focus on 
cultural frame alignment rather than in the work of law scholars 
who simply focus on mobilization, counter-mobilization, and “rights 
discourse.”180 Leading LGB litigation scholar William Eskridge pro-
vides an example. Following the traditional legal perspective that 
“social movements literature does not adequately reflect the im-
portance of law,” Eskridge cites relatively few social movement stud-
ies in his work.181 Yet, as this section will show, this approach misses 
important strategic aspects of constitutional litigation surrounding 
issues of gay rights, a point best made by comparing the history of 
gay rights as recounted by Eskridge to the history of gay rights as 
recounted by Ellen Andersen, a social movement theorist and politi-
cal scientist at the cutting edge of merging the study of constitutional 
litigation with cultural frame alignment.182
 At first glance, Andersen and Eskridge appear quite similar. Both 
discuss significant historical events that impacted the LGB movement, 
including the 1948 Kinsey Report, the Model Penal Code’s decriminali-
zation of sodomy in 1962, and the Stonewall Riot.183 Both also discuss 
the formation of litigation groups like Lambda Legal as well as the 
broader implications of conservative reactions to such developments.184
 Yet, Eskridge and Andersen differ in their recovery of the strate-
gic frame alignment that went into LGB litigation decisions. For ex-
ample, Eskridge describes the litigation campaign against sodomy 
laws in the 1970s to be a factor of Supreme Court privacy rulings, 
opinions which encouraged groups like the ACLU to challenge state 
sodomy statutes.185 By contrast, Andersen shows how the decision to 
pursue privacy litigation was not simply a factor of Supreme Court 
privacy rulings, but a strategic choice not to pursue more common 
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claims by LGB parents desiring legal custody of their children.186
Cognizant that the Supreme Court’s privacy jurisprudence aimed to 
shield heterosexual couples from the state, Lambda made the strate-
gic decision to attack laws limiting what private couples could do in 
the privacy of their own homes, including sexual acts that applied to 
both heterosexual and homosexual pairs.187 By contrast, Lambda 
lawyers deliberately avoided lawsuits that aimed to extend custody 
rights to gay parents, reasoning that such a move would lack the 
kind of general support that a more neutral push for privacy might 
achieve.188 Lambda’s strategic decision to downplay custody and em-
phasize privacy reflected an astute alignment of the legal frame of 
gay rights with the cultural frame of heterosexual, middle class  
privacy interests.189
 Despite privacy’s promise, lawsuits challenging sodomy statutes 
based on a privacy theory confronted their own strategic challenges, 
a problem that Andersen identifies but Eskridge occludes. For exam-
ple, in one of the first suits to challenge a state sodomy statute, Doe 
v. Commonwealth’s Attorney, the ACLU brought a legal challenge to 
Virginia’s sodomy law in federal district court in 1973.190 As Eskridge 
tells it, the fact that a three-judge panel was assigned to hear the 
case bore little significance. “The majority of the three-judge court 
rejected the ACLU arguments,” writes Eskridge, and “[t]he Supreme 
Court summarily affirmed.”191 To Andersen, however, the ACLU’s 
decision to appeal the ruling of a three-judge panel was a strategic 
frame alignment mistake, one that exacerbated the challenge of over-
turning sodomy laws in court.192 How so? Because of the three-judge 
panel, the ACLU was able to exploit a rare procedural provision that 
allowed for direct, automatic appeal to the Supreme Court.193 Under 
this rule, the Supreme Court could not choose to deny certiorari but 
had to review the case, leading Andersen to conclude that the ACLU 
actually forced a decision that may have been better left for some lat-
er date, when the legal and cultural frames regarding sodomy laws 
were more closely aligned.194 As it was, however, the Supreme Court 
                                                                                                                  
 186. See ANDERSEN, supra note 9, at 32. 
 187. Id. at 33-34. 
 188. Id. at 32-33. 
 189. Id. Initially the concern of elites, privacy became a middle class concern following 
World War II as thousands of American families adopted new modes of living—
suburbanization—and embraced new modes of leisure, including consequence-free, contra-
ceptive-protected sex—both of which amplified popular interest in privacy, an “interest 
whose importance,” notes William J. Stuntz, “grows with one’s bank account, or one’s 
square footage.” William J. Stuntz, The Distribution of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 67 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1265, 1289 (1999). 
 190. 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1200 (E.D. Va. 1975). 
 191. ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW, supra note 177, at 105. 
 192. See ANDERSEN, supra note 9, at 66. 
 193. Id.
 194. Id. at 66-67. 
2011] SHOTGUNS, WEDDINGS, AND LUNCH COUNTERS 373
ended up affirming a district court decision holding that privacy pro-
tections did not extend to homosexual couples, a ruling that arguably 
had some precedential weight.195 Though Eskridge is correct that the 
Supreme Court affirmed Doe, his account misses a potentially im-
portant lesson for both social movement scholars and litigators, 
namely the question of how structuring appeals might factor into cul-
tural frame alignment. 
 More occlusions emerge in Eskridge’s account of the events that 
led from Doe to Bowers v. Hardwick, decided in 1986.196 While
Eskridge acknowledges that state trends toward overturning sodomy 
laws increased from 1976—the year Doe was decided—to 1982, the 
year Hardwick was filed, he omits at least two reasons why LGB 
lawyers felt that a federal challenge to sodomy statutes made strate-
gic sense. First, Eskridge neglects to mention Ronald Reagan’s presi-
dential victory in 1980, which according to Andersen caused LGB lit-
igators to accelerate an appeal before more conservative justices 
could be appointed to the court.197 Second, Eskridge avoids discussing 
a Texas district court’s ruling in Baker v. Wade,198 a case similar to 
Bowers decided in 1982, the same year that Bowers was filed.199 In
Baker, the plaintiff presented evidence suggesting that social and 
even medical attitudes towards homosexuals were changing, essen-
tially altering the structure of legal opportunity for gay rights 
claims.200 For example, the plaintiffs presented evidence that the 
American Psychiatric Association had removed homosexuality from 
its list of mental disorders; that homosexuality had no statistical cor-
relation to higher crime; and that homosexuality was not simply a 
matter of moral choice.201 Much of this testimony was delivered by 
experts, indicating that views of homosexuality were changing rapid-
ly, at least among elites.202
 Ironically, just as elites seemed to be softening their attitudes to-
wards homosexuality, more conservative rustlings could be heard 
coming from the base, leading to the third omission that Eskridge 
leaves out of his analysis.203 Specifically, the election of Ronald Rea-
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gan in 1980 tolled an ominous bell for gay rights activists, not be-
cause Reagan personally made homosexuality a campaign issue, but 
because much of his support came from moral reactionaries associat-
ed with the Christian Right.204 Though Reagan never identified him-
self as an evangelical, his victory raised questions for gay litigants, 
convincing some that assaults on sodomy laws should wait, while 
persuading others that legal attacks should commence forthwith be-
fore Reagan could appoint moral conservatives to the federal 
courts.205 Ambivalence ensued. When a legal group called the Gay 
Rights Advocates, or GRA, challenged an Oklahoma law making 
“ ‘public homosexual conduct or activity’ ” grounds for firing school 
teachers, Lambda counseled against pursuing the matter out of fear 
that a loss at the circuit level might preclude future gay rights 
claims.206 Andersen covers this reluctance, showing how it illustrates 
conscious frame alignment, but Eskridge ignores it, even indicating 
that Lambda was in favor of the litigation.207
 By omitting strategic considerations like Lambda’s reluctance to 
participate in the Oklahoma case, Eskridge fails to fully explain why 
Bowers v. Hardwick was filed when it was.208 This, in turn, precludes 
a larger understanding of how strategic frame alignment works. As
we have seen, reasonable choices can misfire in the long run, but still 
constitute reasonable choices at the time, arguably like Thurgood 
Marshall’s decision to focus on child psychology in Brown.209
 Conversely, lawyers who appear to be making unreasonable 
choices may have a deeper theory guiding their litigation decisions, 
as did Lambda in Bowers. For example, Eskridge himself notes that 
lawyers for the plaintiff in Bowers focused on Lewis F. Powell, Jr., a 
Nixon appointee who was socially conservative yet favored privacy 
protections of abortion.210 Andersen indicates this emphasis was even 
more strategic, influenced in part by Powell’s vote to strike down a 
New York law limiting the distribution of contraceptives in 1977, 
again on privacy grounds.211 Powell’s recurring interest in privacy led 
Lambda to suspect that he may have been prone to expanding pri-
vacy protections even more, including to consensual behavior be-
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tween same-sex adults.212 Yet, even though the legal frame of gay 
rights and the cultural frame of privacy seemed like they might line 
up, Powell proved unwilling. He conceded that if Hardwick had been 
incarcerated he might have ruled in his favor, reasoning that it was a 
violation of the Eighth Amendment to punish someone as severely for 
sodomy as for “aggravated battery . . . first-degree arson . . . and rob-
bery,” but Powell ultimately found that because Georgia had dropped 
its prosecution of Hardwick, he suffered no real harm.213
 Though Lewis Powell proved to be the critical vote against Mi-
chael Hardwick, larger historical forces contributed to the decision’s 
outcome as well. One, clearly, was the election of Ronald Reagan in 
1980, which placed Sandra Day O’Connor on the Court, giving Geor-
gia a critical conservative vote in what would become a five-to-four 
decision.214 Another factor was a shift in the cultural frame of gay 
rights due to AIDS.215 First recognized as a health crisis in the mid-
1980s, the emergence of AIDS engendered a backlash in many states 
against homosexuality on the grounds that gays jeopardized public 
health.216 In 1986, for example, Missouri’s Supreme Court upheld the 
state’s sodomy law not on moral grounds, but out of a concern for 
public health, holding that “the general promiscuity characteristic of 
the homosexual lifestyle made such acts among homosexuals particu-
larly deserving of regulation.”217 Here, health concerns over AIDS 
helped to explain how the state could rationalize the decriminaliza-
tion of oral and anal sex between people of the opposite sex, mean-
while retaining criminal sanctions for same-sex couples.218
 Health concerns over AIDS, conservative appointments to the fed-
eral judiciary, and Bowers v. Hardwick all reduced the structure of 
legal opportunities open to gay rights advocates in the 1980s, mark-
ing a shift in the nation’s cultural frame against homosexual liti-
gants. Yet, Bowers arguably had a positive impact as well, one that 
Andersen documents but Eskridge largely ignores. To Eskridge, 
Bowers’ main contribution was pedagogical, a point he makes by not-
ing that the ruling “transformed the constitutional law curriculum of 
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Yale and every other law school in America.”219 To Andersen, by con-
trast, Bowers’s primary contribution was political: together with the 
crisis over AIDS, argues Andersen, Bowers helped encourage social 
movement organizing.220 Rather than accept the Supreme Court’s 
opinion, LGB activists rallied against it, holding a March on Wash-
ington for Lesbian and Gay Rights in 1987—a clear parallel to the 
civil rights movement—and tripling donations to Lambda from 1985 
to 1986.221
 While Andersen arguably does a better job of capturing the link 
between constitutional litigation and social movement organizing 
than Eskridge, both Eskridge and Andersen show how LGB mobili-
zation polarized electoral politics in states across the country, pitting 
urban cosmopolitans against rural evangelicals.222 “Between 1972 and 
1992,” observes Eskridge, LGB activists “persuaded dozens of city 
and county councils to adopt ordinances prohibiting employers, pub-
lic accommodations, and landlords from discriminating against em-
ployees, tenants, and patrons on the basis of their sexual orienta-
tion.”223  Though moral conservatives tried to fight such initiatives at 
the local level, they tended to be out-numbered, leading to statewide, 
conservative coalitions that sought to overturn localized gay protec-
tions through state referenda.224
 When Colorado enacted such a referendum in 1992, it triggered 
an automatic LGB response.225 Rather than engage in the political 
spade-work necessary to transform majority opinion, Lambda Legal 
and others made a direct appeal to the courts, gambling that the le-
gal frame of equal protection, the same constitutional provision used 
in Brown, would sway the federal judiciary.226 Lambda even mim-
icked the NAACP’s strategy in Brown by introducing sociological da-
ta showing that “LGB people posed neither physical nor psychologi-
cal harm to children.”227 Though such evidence played less of a role in 
Romer v. Evans228 than it did in Brown, the end result proved the 
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same: Lamba’s appeal inspired the Court to overturn Amendment 2 
in 1996.229
 For Eskridge, Romer represented “that rare Supreme Court deci-
sion that successfully anticipated changes in public opinion before 
they were clear to other officials.”230 Yet, the question of just how far 
public opinion would go in the direction of gay rights remained un-
certain. Attuned to cultural frames, Andersen provided a more con-
servative analysis, positing that Romer represented a combination of 
legal frames undergirding the case particularly equal protection ju-
risprudence, and cultural frames, or liberal values held by legal 
elites.231 That Romer represented an elite view, something that An-
dersen stresses, is important to note for at least two reasons. One, it 
illustrates the complexity of cultural frames, indicating how diverg-
ing opinions, beliefs, and moral frameworks can exist in the same 
culture at the same time, making it hard to determine whether cer-
tain legal frames will align or not. Two, it underscores the problem of 
intracultural conflict, or warring values, the victor of which can 
prove determinative of legal results.  
 Out of all the Justices on the Court at the time Romer was decid-
ed, only Antonin Scalia identified the cultural tensions at stake in 
the decision. To his mind, the Court had interfered in nothing less 
than a “Kulturkampf” or cultural war between secular homophiles 
and “modest” Coloradans interested in preserving “traditional sexual 
mores.”232 While one way to interpret this was that Scalia endorsed “a 
state-sponsored campaign to force a minority into conformity,” an-
other possible interpretation, discredited by Eskridge, was that Scal-
ia really meant a “culture clash between fundamentalists and progay 
nomoi,” or interests.233
Pursuant to this view, progay and antigay activists were literally 
engaged in a battle for hearts and minds, a cultural conflict with di-
rect political results, something that cultural theorist Stuart Hall 
called a “war of position.”234 However, neither Andersen nor Eskridge 
invoke Hall’s analytic, limiting the extent to which either success-
fully convey the role that culture played in the post-Romer era. For 
example, even though Andersen mentions that fears of AIDS de-
clined in the 1980s, she fails to mention obvious cultural flashpoints 
like Ryan White, who contracted AIDS from a blood transfusion 
when he was fourteen years old and quickly became a national celeb-
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rity after fighting local opposition to enroll in public school in Koko-
mo, Indiana in 1985.235 Andersen also omits mention of National 
Basketball Association star Magic Johnson who contracted the dis-
ease through heterosexual sex and proved, to many, that one could 
live with the condition.236 Such figures helped “pierce myths” about 
AIDS, convincing average voters that the disease was not simply a 
homosexual threat.237
 The emergence of respectable victims like Magic Johnson and 
Ryan White in the 1980s prefigured a much more aggressive cam-
paign to normalize homosexuality undertaken, perhaps ironically, by 
corporate interests involved in media and marketing in the 1990s.238
As Eskridge—who actually cites more pop culture references than 
Andersen—puts it, “homosexuality began to saturate public culture, 
with more positive and complex depictions of gay people showing up 
in the movies, on Broadway, in popular stories and novels, and even 
on television,” presumably all with profitable results.239 For example, 
Eskridge cites Will and Grace, a National Broadcasting Corporation 
(NBC) sitcom featuring Debra Messing and Eric McCormack as a 
straight woman and gay man sharing an apartment.240 While critics 
complained that the program limited gay roles to instances where 
“sexually viable” gay males were “safely (albeit chastely) paired with 
a heterosexual woman,” the series, which premiered in 1998 went on 
to draw an average weekly audience of almost seventeen million 
viewers, making it the “third-most watched sitcom on network televi-
sion” in 2002.241
 Perhaps just as groundbreaking was Ellen, another popular sit-
com that predated Will and Grace by a year, and focused on come-
dian Ellen DeGeneres.242 Though lesbian, DeGeneres did not make 
her sexual preference clear until after building a dedicated viewing 
audience, at which point the show’s writers consciously devised a 
sympathetic coming-out moment, when Ellen declared offhandedly at 
an airport that she was, in fact, gay.243 Though controversial, Ellen’s
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ratings remained high, making her the first “avowedly gay leading 
character in television history.”244
 Perhaps even more importantly, Ellen’s advertisers stayed.245 Once 
pioneering progay business models like Ellen succeeded, corporations 
felt more comfortable reaching out more openly to gay consumers, a 
market demographic that some estimated to be worth over $400 bil-
lion.246 To take just one example, in 1998, the same year that Will & 
Grace premiered, Levi Strauss & Co. embarked on an “ambitious 
marketing campaign aimed at gay men and lesbians,” in the hopes 
that it might “reverse flagging sales” by appealing to “trend-setting 
consumers.”247 Other companies followed, “aiming sales pitches at 
homosexuals for products from cars to computers.”248
 Such shifts in consumer culture are not mentioned by Andersen or 
Eskridge, but help explain why Lambda decided to revisit the Court’s 
position on state sodomy laws in 1998, over ten years after Bowers.249
Also, a string of victories against sodomy statutes at the state level, 
together with a string of legislative repeals of sodomy laws, which 
Andersen and Eskridge do mention, all indicated that cultural 
frames regarding sodomy were veering in the direction of LGB inter-
ests.250 Sensing opportunity, Lambda attorneys challenged the arrest 
of a gay man for sodomy in Houston, Texas in 1998, arguing that the 
state sodomy statute violated both equal protection and privacy.251
 In a cautionary 2003 ruling, Justice Anthony Kennedy marshaled 
a majority declaring that the Texas law violated privacy, but not 
equal protection.252 Though some took this to be a categorical victory 
for LGB interests, both Eskridge and Andersen picked up on the 
mixed signals, namely that while some cultural progress in the direc-
tion of gay rights had been achieved, more aggressive initiatives on 
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behalf of LGB interests were unlikely to prevail.253 To Eskridge, Law-
rence indicated “a confluence of opinion” between “sexual pro-choice 
liberals, . . . relationals who understood that gay people formed fami-
lies and committed unions, and . . . pragmatic traditionalists who be-
lieved the legal line should be drawn at gay marriage rather than 
homosexual criminality.”254 To Andersen, the ruling reflected a simple 
matter of frame alignment.255
 While both analytical descriptions were arguably correct, Ander-
sen’s was less idiosyncratic. Rather than invoke arcane terms like 
“relationals” and “pragmatic traditionalists” she made the simple, 
straightforward case that cultural frames had evolved since Bowers,
but not as far as LGB activists might have liked. Based on her analy-
sis of Lawrence, one could deduce that moves in the direction of more 
outwardly gay causes like same-sex marriage were likely to fail. Even 
same-sex marriage cases seemed to suggest as much. As Andersen 
herself illustrates, two same-sex plaintiffs in Alaska sued the state 
for marriage licenses in 1998, the same year that Lawrence was filed, 
only to precipitate a constitutional backlash as heterosexual voters 
approved an amendment restricting marriage to persons of the oppo-
site sex, indicating cultural frames were resistant to same-sex mar-
riage.256 Meanwhile, two same-sex plaintiffs in Hawaii met similar 
resistance as voters amended the state constitution to prohibit same-
sex marriage there as well.257 By 2008, twenty-nine states had enact-
ed bans on gay matrimony.258
 While anyone versed in cultural frame alignment might have in-
terpreted the rise of nearly thirty state bans against same-sex mar-
riage as an indication that cultural frames were closing, this did not 
occur to constitutional attorney Ted Olson, a well-known conserva-
tive who had argued against affirmative action in federal contract-
ing, assisted in the impeachment of President Clinton, and served as 
President George W. Bush’s solicitor general.259 Only ten days after 
California voters approved a proposition banning same-sex marriage, 
Michele Reiner, Hollywood director Robert Reiner’s wife, recom-
mended that a friend contact Olson about the possibility of an ap-
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peal.260 After a meeting at Reiner’s home, Olson took the case, 
prompting speculation that he might have been interested in seeing 
the appeal lose.261 While evidence emerged suggesting that this was 
not the case, leading gay-rights organizations like Lambda Legal is-
sued a public statement opposing Olson’s advocacy, arguing that the 
“odds of success” for a Supreme Court ruling were not good, and that 
the Court “typically does not get too far ahead of either public opin-
ion or the law in the majority of states.”262 Instead of rushing to court, 
Lambda counseled patience, and attention to the democratic pro-
cess.263 “We lost the right to marry in California at the ballot box,” 
declared the group, and “[t]hat’s where we need to win it back.”264
While Lambda had once urged a rush to the Court in Bowers, afraid 
that newly elected President Ronald Reagan would appoint conserva-
tives to the nation’s highest tribunal, Barack Obama’s victory in 2008 
indicated that discretion might be a more prudent strategy here, par-
ticularly given the likelihood that Obama might appoint liberals to 
the Court over the course of his administration.265
 Even William Eskridge, who had not invoked frame alignment in 
any of his studies of LGB legal campaigns, publicly declared that he 
remained “pessimistic” about Olson’s chances for success.266 Parallel-
ing Lambda, Eskridge expressed concern that since Proposition 8 had 
been approved, Maine had passed a referendum overturning its 
same-sex marriage law, meanwhile the senates of New York and 
New Jersey, both liberal-leaning, had decided not to allow gay mar-
riage.267 This meant that, while a handful of states allowed same-sex 
couples to marry, a significant majority opposed it.268
 Ignoring obvious trends, Olson began a bizarre frame transfor-
mation effort, hoping to use his conservative credentials as leverage 
against opponents of same-sex unions, and to use the case, Perry v. 
Schwarzenegger, as a “teaching opportunity.”269 Sure that he alone 
could convince conservative America of the intrinsic morality of gay 
marriage, Olson cavalierly declared that “people will listen to us talk 
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about the importance of treating people with dignity and respect,” an 
unlikely outcome, particularly given the fact that even better-known 
conservatives than Olson, including Vice President Dick Cheney, had 
come out in favor of gay marriage, with little visible impact on con-
servative voters.270 Unswayed, Olson published an article entitled 
“The Conservative Case for Gay Marriage,” in Newsweek two days 
before the beginning of trial, positing that same-sex marriage ad-
vanced “values [that] conservatives prize,” among them “a stable 
bond between two individuals,” and a commitment to the “bedrock . . 
. principle of equality” sanctified by the “noble and elegant” words of 
the Declaration of Independence.271
 While Ted Olson’s cavalier foray into LGB litigation is probably 
more attributable to vainglory than to the failure of law schools to 
train students in cultural frame alignment, his case provides an ex-
cellent example of why cultural frames matter. Though largely ig-
nored by constitutional scholars like Eskridge, Siegel, and Klarman, 
frame alignment theory provides a uniform analytic for comparing 
litigation strategies in separate constitutional areas, and even consti-
tutional times, like the Second Amendment, same-sex marriage, and 
civil rights for example. Indeed, once compared to the civil rights liti-
gation in Sullivan and Brown and the Second Amendment litigation 
in McDonald and Heller, Olson’s approach in Perry v. Schwarzeneg-
ger appears to blithely ignore troubling cultural developments, not 
least of them a groundswell of conservative, evangelical opposition to 
the notion of same-sex marriage. Even if Olson succeeds in his litiga-
tion campaign his victory may prove Pyrrhic as conservatives use 
Perry to marshal evangelical support against him. By contrast, the 
NRA’s careful strategizing in Heller and McDonald, neither of which 
evoked a backlash, emerge a much closer cousin to civil rights cases 
like New York Times v. Sullivan in the 1960s. 
V.   CONCLUSION
 At a symposium on social movements and law reform held at the 
University of Pennsylvania Law School in 2001, Edward L. Rubin 
lamented that legal academics remained “largely oblivious” to work 
done by social movement scholars in sociology and political science.272
Despite Rubin’s plea that law scholars “mak[e] contact with the so-
cial movements literature,” however, relatively little has been done 
in that direction, particularly in regard to the subfield of social 
movement theory known as frame alignment.273 As this Article has 
                                                                                                                  
 270. Id.
 271. Theodore B. Olson, The Conservative Case for Gay Marriage; Why same-sex mar-
riage is an American value, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 9, 2010, at 48.  
 272. Rubin, supra note 6, at 2. 
 273. See id. at 3.  
2011] SHOTGUNS, WEDDINGS, AND LUNCH COUNTERS 383
attempted to show, leading scholars of civil rights, Second Amend-
ment litigation, and LGB litigation have all ignored frame alignment 
theory and in so doing not only missed strategic aspects of their own 
chosen areas of inquiry, but also failed to see the degree of similarity 
across divergent constitutional fields.
 To illustrate, Michael J. Klarman’s analysis of civil rights activ-
ism in the aftermath of Brown posits that a southern backlash to the 
opinion created an opportunity that civil rights activists could exploit 
through the use of direct action protest.274 Missing from this analysis, 
however, is any awareness of the fact that cultural frames surround-
ing school integration in the 1950s became inextricably linked to cul-
tural frames surrounding delinquency, and that northern interest in 
desegregation and southern hysteria over desegregation both de-
clined rapidly by the end of the decade.275 When civil rights activists 
decided to stage sit-in demonstrations in 1960 they did not benefit 
from a backlash to Brown so much as work to create a new backlash, 
one that recast cultural assumptions about race to the nation.276
 Meanwhile, civil rights litigators shifted their frame alignment 
strategies to match new developments initiated by social movement 
actors on the ground.277 Whereas Thurgood Marshall had once gam-
bled that aligning the legal frame of civil rights with cultural frames 
surrounding the psychological development of children, this frame 
alignment strategy failed to be of any use to the direct action phase 
of the civil rights movement.278 In fact, focusing on the psychological 
development of children only aided counterframing moves initiated 
by segregationists.279 Consequently, civil rights litigator Herbert 
Wechsler, a veteran of aligning civil rights legal claims with larger 
cultural frames going back to the 1930s, took a new tact, defending 
northern media interests who had covered the sit-in demonstrations 
from southern libel suits.280 Not attuned to the subtle shifts in frame 
alignment being carried out by litigators like Wechsler, Klarman oc-
cludes the significance of New York Times v. Sullivan to the race 
beat, reinforcing a larger misconception about the central role of cul-
ture in civil rights reform, and about the precise manner in which 
legal cases facilitated cultural frame alignment and impacted consti-
tutional results.281
                                                                                                                  
 274. See supra Part II.  
 275. See supra Part II. 
 276. See supra Part II. 
 277. See supra Part II. 
 278. See supra Part II. 
 279. See supra Part II. 
 280. See supra Part II. 
 281. To Pulitzer Prize-winning journalists Gene Roberts and Hank Klibanoff New York 
Times v. Sullivan represented “a form of liberation.” See ROBERTS & KLIBANOFF, supra 
note 111, at 364. 
384 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:345 
 Reva Siegel makes a similar mistake in the Second Amendment 
context. Just as Klarman reads civil rights strategy in broad brush 
strokes, lumping over a decade of strategic decisionmaking into an 
overly simplistic backlash thesis, so too does Siegel read Second 
Amendment litigation as a relatively monolithic process of “popular 
constitutionalism.”282 To Siegel, gun rights groups like the NRA 
mounted a four-decade campaign to associate the Second Amend-
ment with an individual right to bear arms, particularly handguns 
and hunting rifles.283 Though true in the broad sense, missing from 
Siegel’s analysis is any sense of the strategic frame alignment choic-
es that groups like the NRA made, particularly their decision not to 
deregulate the ownership of automatic weapons.284 Precisely because 
cultural frames regarding automatic weapons were relatively nega-
tive following the Gun Control Act of 1968, the NRA’s litigation 
strategy was actually a relatively conservative frame alignment ap-
proach, one that stressed culturally popular notions of sportsman-
ship and self-defense.285
 Further missing from Siegel’s analysis of Second Amendment liti-
gation is the extent to which the NRA went to establish the right to 
self-defense, and to some extent the individual right to bear arms as 
“civil rights.”286 Again, this strategy represented an exercise in frame 
alignment inspired, in large part, by the success of the civil rights 
movement, a movement that the NRA consciously sought to identify 
itself with, both by designating the nation’s “oldest” civil rights or-
ganization in its Heller brief, and by stressing the role that gun own-
ership played in denying African Americans their citizenship rights 
during both the Colonial and Reconstruction eras.287
 Finally, a third example of missed opportunities due to avoidance 
of social movement theory can be found in William Eskridge’s recov-
ery of LGB litigation strategies.288 When compared to the work of so-
cial movement scholars like political scientist Ellen Andersen, 
Eskridge’s recovery of critical moments in the legal history of the 
LGB succumbs to the same problems of overgeneralization that can 
be found in Siegel and Klarman’s work. To take just a few examples, 
while Eskridge contends that the decision by organizations like 
Lambda to focus on privacy concerns in the 1970s were logical out-
growths of the Warren Court’s privacy jurisprudence, missing is any 
awareness of the strategic frame alignment choices that went into 
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the LGB movement’s privacy based assault on state sodomy laws.289
As Andersen shows, the most common legal complaints to emerge in 
LGB communities in the 1970s did not involve sodomy statutes but 
custody claims by gay parents.290 Yet, Lambda recognized that the 
cultural frames surrounding gay parenthood were much more nega-
tive than cultural frames surrounding privacy, hence the frame 
alignment choice to target sodomy statutes.291
 Once into his discussion of sodomy cases, Eskridge occludes 
alignment choices that involved appellate procedure as well.292 In dis-
cussing the ACLU’s decision to attack Virginia’s sodomy statute in 
1973, for example, Eskridge fails to note that the ACLU’s decision to 
appeal a three-judge panel ruling at the federal district level consti-
tuted a strategic mistake.293 While a normal appeal would have al-
lowed the Supreme Court to consider whether or not to grant certio-
rari, the three-judge appeal forced the Supreme Court to hear the 
case, leading to a negative ruling that, Andersen posits, may have 
actually have rushed the issue, generating a negative precedent 
counterproductive to the legal assault on sodomy laws generally.294
 While other omissions emerge regarding both Bowers and Law-
rence, what makes such occlusions particularly baffling is that 
Eskridge actually cites Andersen’s work for minor issues of fact, 
meanwhile neglecting her analytic framework.295 Why? Presumably 
more is going on than simply a different set of scholarly concerns, for 
the concerns that Eskridge pursues would actually be better served 
by Andersen’s approach.296 This indicates that Eskridge has been cap-
tured by a larger reluctance to cross disciplinary lines, a reluctance 
that might explain the general resistance to cultural frame analysis 
evident not only in his work, but Siegel and Klarman’s as well.  
 What can be gained from encouraging law scholars to reach across 
interdisciplinary bounds and engage more fully with social move-
ment theory? As this Article has tried to illustrate, social movement 
theory provides an analytic framework that lends itself to the exca-
vation of strategic choices otherwise submerged in simplistic concep-
tions of popular constitutionalism and backlash. Further, sub-fields 
of social movement theory like frame alignment help to foreground 
culture in the analysis of constitutional rights, even as they help to 
reconcile unnecessarily disparate discourses in law, sociology, and 
political science. Finally, even lawyers stand to benefit from cultural 
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frame alignment for it is they who suffer most without at an appro-
priate theoretical understanding of when litigation should be initiat-
ed, how it should be framed, and ultimately how constitutional law 
and social movements intersect.  
